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My topic today is one which is currently exercising many minds, both in Australia 
and further afield, and its outlines are easily described. As always, however, the devil 
is in the detail, so my remarks today will inevitably be both reasonably 
straightforward in Australian nuclear policy terms and far more complex in their 
implications. 
 
The nuclear non-proliferation regime is under serious threat from a number of 
directions and sources in 2007. While Libya has finally renounced its nuclear 
weapons ambitions, North Korea continues spasmodic negotiations in Beijing on the 
status of its weapons program, having recently convinced the world that it is now in 
possession of operational nuclear explosive devices. 
 
On the Indian sub-continent both India and Pakistan continue to confront each other 
with proven nuclear weapons capacities and reliable missile delivery systems. In Iran, 
the government defies the West in its insistence on the peaceful intent of its nuclear 
program, including the known establishment of at least one centrifuge enrichment 
cascade of some 1 300 elements, as the IAEA Inspectors  now report from Natanz. 
While the multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), in which Australia 
participates, has enjoyed some success (notably in respect of Libya’s nuclear 
ambitions) and is growing in international recognition of its utility, there is no doubt 
that there exists the potential for nuclear weapons, their technologies and perhaps 
their delivery systems to fall into the hands of international terrorist organisations. 
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Should this happen, those organisations will not hesitate to use them on the big cities 
of their Western and other enemies, including Australia. 
 
Thus, there is no doubt that the nuclear non-proliferation regime is coming under 
increasing strain in the opening years of the new century, and there is a consequent 
and urgent need to reinforce those practical measures of transparency, oversight, 
verification against materials transfer, and ultimately denial of supply which form the 
NPT’s operational core. 
 
What I want to suggest is that there are emergent opportunities to do just that, and that 
a set of complementary circumstances, in both its domestic and foreign policy 
settings, will allow Australia to participate in meaningful ways in re-focusing and 
shoring up the NPT regime into the middle distance. 
 
The major premises on which my analysis is based are these: 
 
• First, Australia is, and will remain a first order and – in the future - even a 
dominant supplier of uranium oxide into world markets. 
 
• Second, the global demand for uranium is more likely than not to continue to 
rise as atmospheric warming, energy deficits and the price electricity 
producers are willing to pay for uranium also climb. 
 
• Third, efforts by Australia to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation 
regime against incipient erosion of its principal strengths will remain as a 
central pillar of its nuclear policy settings. 
 
• Fourth, a coordinated policy which accounts for the inherent tension between 
the two fundamental elements of Australia’s current nuclear engagement – its 
uranium export and weapons counter-proliferation activities – is both 
technically and politically feasible, and politically and economically desirable. 
It is also in Australia’s national interest. 
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• Finally, Australia is more likely than not, in the short term, to decide to 
establish a domestic nuclear power generation industry and comparatively less 
likely in the short to medium terms also to establish associated fuel cycle 
industries (such as conversion, enrichment, fabrication and reprocessing).  
 
Given these premises, the fundamental elements of Australia’s policy coordination 
challenge I will discuss here, expressed as policy questions, are these: 
 
One: 
How can changes to Australia’s policy in the fields of uranium exploration, mining 
and export be expected to impinge on Australia’s global counter-proliferation 
activities and their global recognition?  
 
Two: 
How can Australia ensure that the conditions under which it exports uranium oxide 
into the future contribute in optimal ways to maximising the strength of Australia’s 
contribution to stemming the spread of nuclear weapons and the technologies which 
produce them? 
 
And three,  
How will a decision to establish a domestic nuclear power generation industry and 
perhaps associated fuel cycle activities modify Australia’s uranium export and 
counter-proliferation policy options? 
 
With these policy premises and challenges in mind, I want first to spend a little time 
discussing the most important immediate effects of changes to Australia’s nuclear 
policy settings. 
 
The speech by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Kevin Rudd to the 2007 ALP 
National Conference in Sydney on 28 April 2007 on Australia’s uranium debate 
coincided with an announcement by the Prime Minister, Mr Howard, that the 
Australian Government had decided to proceed with preparations to accommodate the 
establishment of an Australian nuclear power generation industry. 
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Given the proximity of the next Federal election, this is not politically surprising. 
However, the subsequent and only narrowly-passed ALP Conference motion to do 
away with the Labor Party’s long-standing “Three Uranium Mines” policy was less 
easy to predict. Its significance, though, is clear. In the event of a Labor Party victory 
in October, Australia will now continue to respond to commercial pressures and 
opportunities by ramping up uranium exploration activities (and uranium production 
at existing mines) as well as developing new deposits.  
 
What consequences, then, can be expected to follow from the reality of rising levels 
of uranium exports, and how will those effects translate into modified counter-
proliferation policy settings? At first glance, it appears that Australia already has in 
place a regime of conditions of uranium supply which are sufficiently robust as not to 
require significant modification. Their major elements are well known: 
• Australia currently has in place 19 bilateral safeguard agreements covering 36 
countries (including the Euratom states), with the China agreement to come. 
• These agreements apply specific safeguards to Australian Obligated Nuclear 
Material (AONM) beyond the additionally obligatory standard IAEA 
safeguards agreement, in respect of which all non-nuclear weapon status 
recipient states must also have negotiated an Additional Protocol on full scope 
safeguards with the IAEA. 
• Finally, its bilateral safeguard agreements require Australia’s consent to the 
following: 
o the exclusively peaceful use of AONM 
o re-transfer to third parties of AONM only on the basis of 
internationally accepted physical security standards 
o coverage of AONM by the IAEA or fallback safeguards arrangements 
for the full  life of the material 
o its enrichment for fuel element reprocessing involving AONM beyond 
20% U235. 
  
Taken together, the conditions under which Australia will currently agree to sell 
uranium to NPT signatory states are probably the most stringent in the global 
 4
Hubbard, Christopher (2007) Uranium exports and non-proliferation: a policy coordination challenge, 
in The International Expert Workshop, The Wine Centre, North Terrace, Adelaide, 7-8 June, 2007. 
 
 
marketplace. Nevertheless, it is also probable that they will be enhanced even further 
by either a Coalition or ALP government from October 2007. 
Leader of the Opposition Rudd declared in his April Conference speech that 
Australia has supplied uranium to an energy-hungry world for many years, and that it 
must continue to do so. But his caveat was that uranium exports must in the future be 
conducted in the context of “… [a] non-proliferation regime that is the most robust 
possible …”, given that the NPT, its regime, and the IAEA itself are, to use Rudd’s 
phrase, coming under increasing duress. 
 
How to respond to this challenge? Rudd’s formula comprises the following: 
 
• Strengthening export control regimes and the rights and authority of the IAEA. 
• Tightened controls over the export of nuclear materials and technology. 
• Seeking to make adherence to an IAEA Additional Protocol a mandatory 
condition of supply by Nuclear Supplier Group states for all relevant transfers. 
• Seeking to criminalise actions by individuals and corporations who assist in 
nuclear proliferation. 
• Sponsoring a UN Security Council resolution addressing penalties to be 
imposed on states for withdrawal from the NPT. 
 
And it seems clear that the alternative Australian Prime Minister is on the right track 
here, especially in terms of the need to strengthen the effectiveness of the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee in maintaining the currency of controls 
over dual use technologies. As technology develops, so too must oversight and control 
track relevant changes to those which can be used for non-peaceful, as well as 
peaceful purposes. More generally, there is no doubt that, in reality, room still exists 
for Australia to act either unilaterally and / or in the context of the NPT regime to 
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Australia is not without substantial global recognition for its work over many years in 
counter-proliferation, and is listened to carefully in fora such as the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group, the Zangger Committee and the IAEA itself. In an international legal sense, 
Australia is party, among others, to the 1980 UN Convention on the Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the 1997 Joint Convention on the 
Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. 
Australia was also instrumental in the development of the Additional Protocol to 
IAEA Nuclear Safeguards Agreements. 
 
So Australia, in these and other respects, stands at or near the zenith of global nuclear 
counter-proliferation activities. Once Australia releases its potential for gaining a 
growing share of a burgeoning global uranium market, it will also have within its 
grasp a significantly enhanced capacity, at least in the short to medium terms, to 
improve the effectiveness of major aspects of its nuclear counter-proliferation 
policies. 
 
How So? Australia’s rising presence in the global uranium market, combined with its 
extant advantages in terms of the counter-proliferation measures already outlined, will 
bestow on it capacities for driving the counter-proliferation future from the front rank 
of the world’s nuclear nations. The decision by the federal government to clear the 
way for commercial development of a domestic nuclear power generation industry 
will only enhance that outcome. 
 
So, while there is only a very small possibility that an increase in the volume of 
Australian uranium exports would increase overall diversion and proliferation risks, 
Australia now has the opportunity to drive change which enhances security against 
proliferation in fields in which real risk is growing. The revelation in 2004 of the 
A.Q. Khan network of international trafficking in uranium enrichment technologies to 
Iran, Libya and North Korea was the clearest indication yet of the size and seriousness 
of clandestine proliferation activities around the world. By working closely with 
friends and allies, the international community generally and within the NPT regime, 
Australia can make a growing difference in counter-proliferation. 
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The fields in which Australia will experience the most significant levels of enhanced 
agency of this kind (and the corollary, of course, is greater expectations of that agency 
by the international community) are: 
 
• High Level Waste (HLW) waste management and disposal. 
• International fuel leasing, enrichment and reprocessing arrangements such as 
the US - proposed Global Nuclear Energy Program (GNEP). 
• Generation IV proliferation-resistant nuclear reactor technologies. 
 
HLW waste management and disposal is no doubt the most politically sensitive of the 
three options. Nevertheless, it must be considered seriously, as the UMPNER report 
has found. The technologies necessary to safely store and sequestrate HLW in deep 
repositories is both mature and reliable, and there is no insoluble barrier to Australia 
offering to accept the return of its uranium in the form of spent fuel elements for long 
term sequestration. Australia’s stable geology in fact makes parts of this country an 
ideal site for geo-sequestration on a commercial scale. The establishment of a 
Commonwealth Radioactive Waste Management facility for domestic material in the 
Northern Territory, announced in 2004, could well form the basis of an international 
waste management service. 
 
For those countries operating open fuel cycle generation technologies, such a service 
would answer many political and policy conundra.  
For Australia it would mean a significant new source of income, reduced possibilities 
for AONM diversion by non-state actors, higher uranium sales, and would further 
enhance Australia’s capacity to influence policy decisions by countries contemplating 
nuclear energy in their response to the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Fuel leasing arrangements are a second practical option for Australia. While still in its 
early stages, a program such as the US-proposed Global Nuclear Energy Partnership 
presents the framework of a longer term fuel leasing program for Australia - given the 
slim likelihood of an indigenous reprocessing and fuel fabrication industry on the 
basis of its cost and the current industry position globally. Nevertheless, there is no 
reason to discount it in longer time frames. 
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Finally, Australia’s embrace and promotion of the Generation IV fast neutron reactor 
technologies – with their shorter-lived HLW and their capacity to burn much of the 
HLW now produced, thus greatly reducing volumes – can help to reshape the future 
of the global nuclear power generation industry. Thorium-based reactor technologies 
are a further possibility for the future. 
 
In the end, though, Australia has one over-riding policy lever for situations in which 
more nuanced policy has failed and there is a clear possibility that AONM is 
unacceptably insecure: denial of supply. Australia will in the future possess the 
unilateral capacity to significantly alter the quantum of uranium oxide entering world 
markets in short and medium time frames, and to do so in a targeted way (i.e. against 
potential, suspected or known weapons proliferators) if it judged that to do so would 
be in the interest of counter-proliferation generally, and thus also in its own interests. 
Those countries which relied to a large degree on Australia for their uranium imports 
– and that will be a growing cohort - would presumably think twice about pursuit of a 
weapons production policy which had this effect. The same would be true for states 
which such as India which allowed weapons or nuclear technologies to fall into the 
hands of non-state agents. 
 
A secondary effect of such a move by Australia would certainly be to distort the 
global market for yellowcake to a degree which would call into question Australia’s 
commitment to the stability of worldwide uranium supplies. The political implication, 
of course, is a judgement about the costs versus the benefits of so radical a policy 
response. Should actual or potential proliferators believe that Australia was capable of 
such a drastic policy shift, that belief may be sufficient to alter the behaviour of those 
seriously considering an attempt at fissionable materials diversion into a weapons 
development program – even those with some capacity to develop indigenous 
uranium supplies over time. 
 
In this context, there is an obvious need for close cooperation with Australia’s fellow 
supplier states (and especially Canada, the world’s current leading producer of 
uranium) to determine the timing and extent of supply denial. In circumstances in 
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which a balance of probabilities pointed towards moves to attempt a diversion of 
fissionable material, it seems probable that commercial rivalry would be replaced with 
a spirit of cooperation in the cause of global nuclear safety. Of course, this scenario 
lies at the outer edge of a counter-proliferation policy continuum, but it must be one 
part of a comprehensive consideration of available policy levers. 
 
The question still remains whether a denial of supply by a dominant uranium exporter 
would ultimately have any real effect on determined proliferators, given the ubiquity 
of uranium in the Earth’s crust, and in sea water. Certainly, the UMPNER Report is 
explicit in its assertion that a supply denial decision would have no impact on 
reducing the potential for diversion of fissionable materials.  
 
While it is certainly true that most states with the requisite financial and technical 
capacities could produce uranium oxide in sufficient quantities for multiple fission 
weapons using their indigenous uranium resources, there is still the question of how to 
convert U3O8 to HEU which is usable in a weapons program. Iran demonstrates the 
complexities of this challenge. 
 
And what of rogue states burdened with authoritarian regimes innocent of scruple in 
terms of their willingness to open their territories to uranium exploration and 
extraction? The fact that most states could produce, in the absence of external sources, 
at least small quantities of uranium oxide does not lead directly to a capacity to 
convert that material into a form usable in a nuclear weapon. The experience of Libya 
highlights the difficulties confronting a potential proliferator state in moving even a 
short distance towards indigenous weapons development (a reality which Australia 
itself confronted for nearly twenty years from the early nineteen fifties when 
contemplating a nuclear deterrent strike force). 
 
I will conclude with some observations about Australia as an agent of change in 
nuclear non-proliferation policy in the coming years. It is often noted that Australia is 
able in some circumstances to “fight above its weight” and to exert international 
influence which is disproportionate to its diplomatic, economic and military clout. As 
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a close and trusted ally of the United States it is often regarded from outsiders as a 
rider on American coat tails. 
 
In the nuclear field, however, the truism of being in the wrong weight division is in 
fact correct. With the glaring omission of a domestic nuclear power generation 
industry, and the suite of nuclear skills and expertise which that demands, Australia 
has been engaged in nuclear affairs for the entire history of the use of the atom for 
energy – in weapons or in reactors. As I mentioned earlier, it certainly canvassed the 
possibility of an Australian nuclear deterrent strike force up to around 1967. With 
significant gaps, Australia has been a supplier of uranium to governments and on 
world markets since the nineteen thirties. Currently, Australia has around 38% of the 
world’s low cost identified reserves, while output is expected to reach around 15 000 
tonnes of U3O8 by 2013 if Olympic Dam is expanded as BHP Billiton intends. In 
addition, new mines coming on stream could significantly raise that figure – as 
UMPNER reports, to some 25 000 tonnes. And there is a very high level of 
exploration activity which will doubtless result in the discovery of new economic ore 
bodies. 
 
There is no doubt that Australia will continue as both a leading global uranium 
supplier and non-proliferation activist state. The two arms of its nuclear policy are, in 
simple terms, in direct tension. It remains to be seen whether, and to what extent, they 
can also – in a careful and incremental way – be developed as complementary sides of 
an integrated and functionally optimal Australian nuclear policy. 
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